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Abstract
This paper discusses the notion of differentiated commitments or burden sharing in the
ongoing negotiations on emissions reductions of greenhouse gases. The negotiations, which
takes place in the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) under the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), is leading up to the third Conference of the Parties
(COP-3), which is scheduled to take place in Kyoto in December later this year. The paper
briefly surveys some of the main issues in the negotiations and argues that the question of
differentiated commitments or burden sharing is only one among many difficult topics on the
negotiating table. Based on some proposed principles of ‘fairness’, a few central indicators are
identified and we provide data on these for a group of OECD countries. We outline some of
the propositions for differentiated commitments in the current negotiations, and concludes that
within the framework of the OECD countries, burden sharing is only possible if countries
outside of the European Union (EU) can compensate USA for the additional greenhouse gas
reductions needed to allow high cost countries to commit to lower abatement than the average
reduction level. However, an attractive option, not explored in this paper, is for the group of
countries outside EU and USA to make a deal with countries with economies in transition, as
these countries generally are expected to have relatively low marginal reduction costs. Further
studies of such ‘east-west’ deals are clearly warranted.
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21. Introduction
The current negotiations taking place under the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) in the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) can be viewed as concerning
three main questions:
1. How large reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should the Annex 1 countries1
commit to in the medium term?
2. How flexible should the implementation be?
3. How should the costs of the commitments be allocated among the participating countries?
The first question is slightly complicated by some disagreement on exactly which countries
should be required to commit themselves to emission reductions. In particular the new OECD
member countries not included in Annex 1, Mexico and South Korea, are a concern. The time
horizon for binding commitments is also a topic for discussion, although the year 2010 now
seems to be in favour among many delegates to the negotiations. Finally, the possibility of
‘time flexibility’ (i.e., budgeting and borrowing emission quotas over time) has been proposed
by the USA in the negotiations.
The second question concerns the problem on whether and how joint implementation and
trade in emission quotas should be allowed under a new protocol or a similar instrument. It is
recognised that such flexibility would lower the cost of implementation of a given Annex 1
commitment, but at the added cost of making the negotiations and eventual treaty more
complex. Thus, the feasibility of reaching an agreement on this issue before the Third meeting
of the Conference of the Parties (COP-3) in Kyoto in December 1997 has been questioned.
There are also differences in positions on who should be allowed to participate in an eventual
flexible implementation. Should it be possible to include parties not required to reduce their
own emissions (e.g. the less developed countries) or should the flexibility only cover
arrangements between Annex 1 parties?
Finally, the third question is on international burden sharing; not between the ‘north’ and the
‘south’, but rather between the industrialised countries. Two main proposals exist on this
issue. One, mainly pushed by the USA, is for a ‘flat rate’ arrangement where all parties to the
treaty commit to a common percentage reduction relative to emission levels in a base year
(usually 1990). In essence this amount to an undifferentiated approach. The other proposal is
less well defined, but amounts to some sort of differentiated commitments based on
characteristics of each country such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, population
size and GHG emission intensities.
                                                          
1
 See Appendix 1 for a list of Annex 1 countries. The Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) also establishes more specific obligations for particular categories of states. Thus, it
distinguishes between members of the OECD (as of 1992) (listed in Annex II to the Convention),
countries in transition to a market economy (Eastern European countries which, together with the OECD
countries, are listed in Annex I), and developing countries. The Convention requires OECD countries to
take the strongest measures, while the states in transition to a market economy are allowed a certain
flexibility. The Convention recognizes that compliance by developing countries will depend on financial
and technical assistance from developed countries; in addition, the needs of least developed countries
and those that are particularly vulnerable to climate change for geographical reasons are given special
consideration (Article 4, paras. 2-7).
32. Differentiated commitments in the climate convention negotiations
Differentiated commitments, in the context of the ongoing climate negotiations, is basically
put forward as a negotiating position for two reasons:
• As a way of achieving a cost effective solution.
• As a way to achieve a ‘fair’ outcome in the negotiations.
Of these, the first is generally considered solvable by the use of appropriate instruments like
trade in emission quotas or by allowing for Joint Implementation of emission reduction
measures. The second issue of fairness is sometimes regarded as too difficult to handle,
involving as it does deep philosophical questions, and it has therefore been suggested to
postpone this issue from at least the current negotiating process, even though the principle of
differentiated commitments is clearly stated in the Convention and the Berlin Mandate. In this
paper I will argue that the fairness issue perhaps is not that much more difficult to handle than
other issues one has to face in the negotiations. Let us therefore start with a (non-
comprehensive) list of some of the issues facing the negotiators.
• The timing issue. When are reductions to take place, should they be relative to a historical
base year or period, or should they be related to a baseline projection of emissions? Should
one be allowed to borrow or bank emissions across time periods? If yes, when should the
emission accounts then be settled?
• The issue of comprehensiveness; that is which greenhouse gases (GHGs) should be
regulated and how should one calculate a proper ‘exchange rate’ between the various
gases2. Also the topic of sinks of greenhouse gases belongs to this class of questions.
• The regional scope of the treaty. A list of so called Annex I countries was drawn up in Rio
in 1992 and the current negotiations take as a starting point that only these countries should
at present be directly affected by climate control policies. Basically the Annex 1 countries
consists of OECD countries as of 1992 and countries with economies in transition.
However, since 1992 new members have joined the OECD and the question as been asked
whether in particular Mexico and South Korea should face the same regulations as the
older OECD members are likely to face.
• The issue of flexible instruments. Should trade in emission quotas and Joint Implementation
be allowed? If so, who should be allowed to participate in these schemes; only parties
whose emissions are to be regulated by a climate treaty or all parties?
• Finally, the issue of ambition level; i.e. what overall reductions in future emission levels
should one aim at in the climate treaty.
In view of this list, burden sharing or differentiated commitments only appears as one among
several difficult issues that has to be tackled in the negotiations. With this background, let us
take a closer look at the two arguments put forward for a solution based on differentiated
commitments.
2.1 Efficiency concerns
It is well known that a least cost solution to the problem of global reductions in emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) is obtained if the net marginal costs of the parties to the treaty are
equalised3. This can be achieved by assigning differentiated commitments to the participating
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 See Fuglestvedt and Skodvin (1996) for a detailed discussion of this topic.
3
 At least in an ideal world. If some of the actors have market power it may create problems, see Hagem
and Westskog, 1996 and Hagem, 1996.
4countries reflecting differences in benefits and costs of emission reductions. It may also be
achieved with a common ‘flat rate’ commitment to reductions if this is combined with suitable
flexible instruments like GHG quota trade or Joint Implementation (JI). Although in an ideal
world this would secure equal marginal costs, the total costs to the parties can vary widely
under the different schemes.
Some difficulties with the efficiency approach to differentiated commitments should be noted:
• It is at present very difficult to quantify the benefit of GHG emission reductions. This is
partly due to the inherent complexities of the climate system, but also due to the side
effects of GHG reductions such as reduction in local pollution, which in many cases is
likely to outweigh the direct benefits of climate control4.
• Although perhaps less complex, also the costs of GHG emission reductions are difficult to
estimate empirically for a number of reasons. Some of the problems are of a conventional
kind in the sense that there are uncertainties associated with the relevant elasticities in the
economies. This is not, however, the main obstacle to obtaining reliable marginal cost
estimates, at least in the industrialised world where economic data are of fairly high
quality. Rather the variety of ways to implement a control policy, a carbon tax say, creates
large problems in identifying a single cost figure. This is partly the well known problem of
identifying a reference or baseline scenario with which to compare the control scenario in
order to identify the costs of the control. Thus, whether removal of subsidies for fossil
fuels is considered part of the baseline scenario or part of the control scenario obviously
will affects the costs of the control to a large degree in many coal producing countries. It
also, however, a problem related to the specific way a policy like a carbon tax is
implemented. Such a tax has the potential of generating quite substantial revenues, and
different ways of allocating these revenues, e.g. reducing the income tax or reducing tax on
investments, may crucially affect the macro economic costs of the control policy.
• Finally, an inherent and important problem associated with all exercises that depends on
projecting the future development of the economy, is the forecasting of technological
development. This is at present a poorly understood field, and given that a climate treaty
has the potential of affecting important international markets like the markets for oil and
gas, it is very difficult to foresee how different control options may affect the technological
development and hence the cost of the control policies.
These notes are not meant to indicate that the issue of cost effectiveness is unimportant or
should be disregarded in the ongoing negotiations. Rather they are meant to highlight that
even in the application of ‘pure’ economic arguments for differentiated commitments or use of
flexible instruments, a pragmatic approach is needed where rough ‘rules of thumb’ is what one
should be looking for. It is sometimes put forward that fairness issues are too difficult to deal
with because of problems we will touch upon in the next section. The point then is that these
difficulties may not in the end be much more difficult than those associated with ‘costing’ the
various control policy options.
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 Secondary benefits of climate policy are those not related to mitigation of climate related damage, but
following as a by-product of the climate policy. Examples include reduced damage to health, materials
and nature due to reduction in the emission of local air pollutants. Other secondary benefits may include
those following from a restructuring of the tax system towards greater reliance on green taxes and away
from more distortive taxes, e.g. the income tax. For discussions and estimations of secondary benefits
related to climate policy, see for instance Alfsen et al. (1992) and Ekin (1996).
52.2 Equity/Fairness issues
What constitute a fair treaty is obviously difficult to specify. In fact the question of what
constitutes fairness for an individual, and even more so - a nation - is a deep philosophical
question without a single answer. Some relevant notions may however be illustrated as in
table 1 based on Rose (1992). The table lists 10 criteria one may consider essential for a fair
treaty5. The criteria are cast in the form of how to distribute emission permits, given that
overall emissions are to be stabilised or reduced. Note that the welfare impact of a control
policy is interpreted as net benefits, i.e. benefits, B, minus costs, C, while the general welfare
level is supposed to be reflected by the measure GDP per capita. In the table, R designate
emission reductions and E emission levels.
Table 1. Some equity criteria
Criterion General description Examples of ‘operational
rule’
1 Horizontal Persons in the same group are treated equally Ci - Bi = equal
2 Vertical Greater concern for the disadvantaged Ci - Bi  ∝ GDPi
3 Ability to pay Parties pay according to their means Ci ∝ GDPi
4 Sovereignty Each nation guaranteed a minimum permit Ri/Ei = equal
5 Egalitarian Every human equal Ri/Ei  ∝ population
6 Market justice Free market is a fair means of allocation and
distribution
Auction entitlements to
highest bidder
7 Consensus A decision is fair if parties agree to it Distribute permits so that a
majority of nations is
satisfied
8 Compensation Pareto rule: No party should be made worse off Ci - Bi < 0
9 Rawl’s
maximin
Maximise welfare of the worst off nation Distribute large proportions
of permits to the poorest
countries
10 Environmental Emphasise ‘rights’ of ecosystem Max Ri
Source: Adapted from Rose, A. (1992): ‘Equity considerations of tradeable carbon emission entitlements’, in
UNCTAD, Combating global warming. Study on global system of tradeable carbon emission entitlements, Geneva:
UNCTAD, as cited in S. Fankhauser (1995): Valuing climate change. The economics of the greenhouse, London:
Earthscan Publications Ltd., p. 135
Note that benefits will depend on aggregate emission reductions, i.e. Bi = Bi(ΣjRj), while costs
are mainly determined by own reductions, i.e. Ci = Ci(Ri). The problem then is to distribute Ri
in a ‘fair’ and equitable manner.
In order to illustrate the problem with a flat rate approach, we reproduce a figure from
Torvanger et al. (1996) showing one example of a calculation of the costs to some OECD
countries under a flat rate agreement of 20 per cent reduction relative to 1993 levels (figure 1).
Although the cost calculations depends on a number of uncertain and perhaps controversial
assumptions, it seems obvious that the burdens of emission reductions are very unevenly
distributed, with relatively clean countries as the losers. The larger countries in emission terms
get a more favourable treatment under this type of protocol.
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 See also Kverndokk (1995).
6Welfare changes - 20 per cent uniform reduction
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Figure 1. Welfare effects of a uniform 20 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions.
2.2.1 Indicators
We note from the list in table 1 that three indicators stand out in the discussion of a fair
distribution of commitments. One is related to national wealth and is most often associated
with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The others are related to GHG emission
intensities, namely emissions per capita and emissions per GDP. One can argue for these
indicators in terms of fairness along the following line:
• The GDP per capita indicator reflects the ability to pay principle, in that rich countries
should reduce more, whatever the costs of reductions.
• Emissions per unit of GDP reflect a right to emit per unit of economic activity in a country.
This indicator may therefore be said to some extent to reflect the ability to pay principle in
table 1, which stress the equalisation of the abatement costs among groups.
• Emissions per capita reflect the egalitarian principle in table 1, where the right of every
human to an equal proportion of total emissions is underlined. Countries with high
emission per capita should therefore reduce more than other countries.
Overall, we find these indicators attractive since countries with high emission intensities are
likely to have many options in reducing emissions. We therefore expect the cost of reduction
in countries with high emission intensities to be smaller than in countries with less emission
intensive economies. On the other hand, countries with high GDP per capita generally have
more resources available to meet the reduction costs and the loss of welfare due to emission
reductions may therefore be relatively smaller in these countries.
Figure 2 shows population size, emission levels and GDP for a selected number of OECD
countries. We see that the USA is dominating in every respect, followed by Japan and the four
large countries of the European Union (EU).
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Figure 2. Population, emission levels and GDP for a selected number of OECD countries.
1990.
The next figure (figure 3) transforms these variables into the respective wealth and emission
intensity indicators. In this figure we have grouped the countries into USA, EU and the rest of
the countries and sorted each group according to their GDP per capita.
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Figure 3. Wealth and emission intensity indicators for some OECD countries. 1990.
Figure 4 shows the wealth and emission indicators in a somewhat different format. The wealth
indicator is 1990 GDP per capita measured in 1990 US$ relative to a population weighted
average. Similarly, the CO2 emissions are calculated relative to a population weighted average
for the region. Thus, values above zero indicate that the corresponding country is wealthier
(measured as GDP per capita at 1990 exchange rates) and have higher per capita emission
than the average value. Thus, the figure divides the countries into “rich” and “poor”, “clean”
and “dirty”. Common sense would argue that “rich” and “dirty” countries should commit to
larger emission reductions than “poor” and “clean” countries.
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Figure 4. Wealth and emission intensities for some OECD countries. Differences from the
respective population weighted averages.
Table 2 gives the data behind figure 4. The table also compares emission and GDP levels with
the relative population size of each country and denotes them as dirty/clean and poor/rich if
their shares of CO2 emissions and GDP deviate more than +/-30 percent from their share of
the total population. The characterization must of course be understood in a relative sense.
Measuring wealth by GDP per capita must be considered as relatively uncontroversial in this
context6. It is perhaps more difficult to decide whether emission intensities should be
measured relative to population size or the size of the economy. However, in practice, the
choice may not matter very much, since there is a high co-linearity between these indicators
for a substantial subgroup of countries, see Figure 5. Note that in the figure, Turkey, Portugal
and Luxembourg has been kept out of the regression calculation, but are shown as outliers in
the figure.
In addition to the indices mentioned above, also other cost related indicators have been
suggested in the ongoing negotiations. Thus, an international climate treaty may have large
impacts on important world markets, e.g. the markets for fossil fuels. Countries with large
trade in these commodities may be expected to be more severely affected than other countries,
either positively or negatively. For this reason Australia have proposed to base differentiated
commitments also on indicators related to trade in fossil fuels. In our mind, this indicator is
more difficult to justify than the indicators discussed above. On the one side, it is true that a
country dependent on export of fossil fuels (e.g. Norway) may face considerable costs in a
regime with an international climate treaty. On the other side, this export activity usually
creates large rents and thus makes the country better off to pay the reduction costs. It may also
seem somewhat idiosyncratic to single out trade of fossil fuels for special treatment; why not
cars or any other internationally traded good?
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 Although there is a large literature on the relations between wealth and welfare. See e.g. K. A. Brekke
(1997).
9Table 2. CO2 emissions, population and GDP as percentage of OECD totals (except Iceland,
Mexico, Czech Republic, South Korea) and deviation of emission and GDP from shares
determined by population shares.
CO2 emissions GDP Population CO2 relative to
population
GDP relative to
population
Australia 2.8 1.8 2.0 dirty -
Austria 0.6 1.0 0.9 clean -
Belgium 1.1 1.1 1.1 - -
Canada 4.3 3.3 3.3 - -
Denmark 0.6 0.8 0.6 - rich
Finland 0.5 0.7 0.6 - -
France 3.6 7.0 6.6 clean -
Germany 8.7 10.0 9.3 - -
Greece 0.7 0.4 1.2 clean poor
Ireland 0.3 0.3 0.4 - -
Italy 4.0 6.5 6.5 clean -
Japan 10.6 18.1 14.2 - -
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 0.04 dirty rich
Netherlands 1.7 1.7 1.8 - -
New Zealand 0.3 0.3 0.4 clean poor
Norway 0.3 0.7 0.5 clean rich
Portugal 0.4 0.4 1.1 clean poor
Spain 2.2 2.9 4.5 clean poor
Sweden 0.5 1.3 1.0 clean -
Switzerland 0.4 1.3 0.8 clean rich
Turkey 1.5 1.0 6.8 clean poor
UK 5.4 5.7 6.7 - -
USA 49.5 33.7 29.7 dirty -
Sources: OECD (1995a); OECD (1995b).
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Figure 5. Relation between normalised CO2 emission per capita and CO2 emission per GDP.
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3. The negotiations
3.1 The proposal of the European Union.
After a rather chaotic period in the negotiations, positions where made more clear during the
sixth session of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) taking place in Bonn in
March. Here, the European union (EU) surprised most delegates by announcing a common
negotiating position in the process leading up to the meeting in Kyoto in December later this
year. In short, EU specifies a 15 per cent reduction in year 2010 relative to 1990 of a basket
of three greenhouse gases: CO2, CH4 and N2O7. EU also stated the intention of coming up
with an interim target for the year 2005.
In addition to specifying an overall reduction target, EU also indicated a burden sharing
among the member countries along the lines depicted in table 3 and figure 6, which, however,
only sum up to a 10 per cent reduction. Additional reductions are therefore required if the 15
per cent target is to be achieved.
EU stated further that within year 2000, means should be developed to include other
greenhouse gases such as HFC, PFC and SF6 in the basket of gases to be regulated. As a
concession, primarily to France, EU also declared that in the longer term more sophisticated
methods of burden sharing should be developed securing a convergence of the emission levels
of the member countries based on suitable emission indicators. This must be seen on the
background that France earlier have stated vigorously that one should aim for equal per capita
emission levels.
Table 3. Differentiated commitments among EU countries
Member countries Emission reductions in 2010
of
CO2, CH4 og N2O
(Weighted by GWP100)
relative to 1990. Percent
Belgium -10
Denmark -25
Germany -25
Greece +30
Spain +17
France 0
Ireland +15
Italy -7
Luxembourg -30
The Netherlands -10
Austria -25
Portugal +40
Finland 0
Sweden +5
Great Britain -10
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 These are to be weighted together by use of their respective greenhouse warming potentials calculated
using a 100 year horizon (GWP100).
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Figure 6. Differentiated commitments in EU.
Two things are noteworthy about the EU proposal. One is the relatively high ambition level of
15 per cent reduction before year 2010 (although this is still far short of what is needed for a
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere). As pointed out by the
proponents of differentiated commitments (e.g. Norway), this ambition level has only been
possible because of the burden sharing envisaged within EU. It has been speculated on how
this differentiation was arrived at, but the answer seems to be that it is the result of a political
process where also other elements that those directly related to climate change has been under
consideration. In any case, EU maintains that no simple formula was employed in the
determination of the national commitments.
The other noteworthy feature is of course the wide discrepancy between the national
commitments, ranging from an increase in emissions of 40 per cent for Portugal (how should
this come about?) and somewhat slower growth in Greece and Spain, to 25 per cent reduction
in countries like Germany, Austria and Denmark (Luxembourg tops the list with 30 per cent
reduction).
In summary, it seems fair to say that the ambitious EU position has been made possible by
securing an internal burden sharing, and that this in turn has been possible because of the tight
integration of the EU member countries. In this manner different topics and conflicts can be
considered simultaneously, thus enlarging the negotiating arena considerably. Unfortunately, a
similar technique may be difficult to apply for other small nations.
3.2 Three groups
After the common declaration of the EU countries, it is reasonable to view the OECD as
consisting of three groups: EU, USA and the rest of the countries (here denoted by RoA I).
Population and GDP wise, these three groups are rather similar. However, they differ with
respect to their CO2 emissions, see figure 7.
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Figure 7. Share of OECD totals for USA, EU and rest of the countries (RoA I). 1993
Transforming these indicators into emission intensities and a wealth indicator reveals that EU
and the residual group are almost identical, while USA both have higher emission intensities
and higher wealth per capita, see figure 8. Given that EU has settled its need for burden
sharing, what is left is for USA and the residual group to agree on a burden sharing. For a
fairer distribution of commitments according to the principles and indicators discussed above,
USA must take on a larger share of the total burden. The problem is of course what the
residual group can offer USA in return for such an arrangement.
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Figure 8. Main indicators for USA, EU and rest of the countries (RoA I). 1993
3.3 Differentiated commitments á la Norway
Norway has put forward a proposal for differentiated commitments based on the above
indicators and the following formulae8
Y A
B
B
C
C
D
Di
i i i
= + +



β χ δ
(1)
Here, Yi is percentage reduction of emissions in country i relative to a business-as-usual
(BAU) scenario in a future year, B denotes CO2-equivalents per GDP, C is GDP per capita and
D is CO2-equivalents per capita. A is an overall scaling factor. The indicators enter the
formulae in a normalised manner, i.e. country values divided by the respective average values.
The three indicators are meant to capture some essential elements behind the differences in
abatement costs among countries, and thus to provide a more ‘fair’ distribution of the required
reductions as discussed in section 2.2.1 above.
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 The proposal is quite similar to some of the proposals put forward and analysed in detail by Torvanger
et al. (1996).
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Essential to the proposal is of course that the weights in the formulae are to be determined
through negotiations. In effect there are then only two degrees of freedom, since the sum of
the weights should be equal to one. It is of course impossible within this restricted room for
negotiations to reflect all of the variability between nations. This is both a weakness and
strength of the proposition. It is a weakness because the negotiated treaty can not be entirely
fair with so crude an instrument for capturing differences between nations. At the same time it
is a strength in that the participants are to some extent forced to use arguments of a principal
nature in the debate. The simplicity of the scheme may also perhaps enhance the possibility
for reaching an agreement within the tight time limits towards the third conference of the
parties in Kyoto in December 1997.
In the figure below (figure 9, left hand columns) we have calculated Yi /A based on a scheme
where each of the three indicators gets equal weights. The countries fall into three broad
groups. If we sort the groups according to whether they are more than 10 per cent from the
central value (equal to one) we find one group representing the North American countries,
Greece, Australia and Luxembourg with high commitments (large reductions), a group of
countries with medium reductions, and finally a group of countries with relatively small
reductions (Portugal, Turkey, Spain, France, Austria, Italy, Norway, New Zealand and
Sweden).
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Figure 9. Relative commitments for reductions
As mentioned previously, in the sample used here there is a large degree of co-linearity
between two of the terms in the formulae, i.e. CO2/GDP and CO2/capita. This implies that the
formulae can be reduced to containing only one degree of freedom (in addition to the
determination of the overall level of emission reduction); namely the weight distribution
between a measure of emission intensity (CO2/capita or CO2/GDP) and wealth (GDP/capita).
Figure 9 above also shows calculations based on an equal weighting of these two degrees of
freedom (right hand column). Relative to the first calculation, more emphasis is now put on
the wealth indicator, thus increasing the obligations of the rich countries and reducing the
commitments of the relatively poor nations.
Figure 10 shows that for the three aggregated groups it does not matter very much whether 2
or 3 degrees of freedom are employed in the ‘Norwegian’ formulae (1) (indicated in the figure
by the terms ‘2 ind.’ and ‘3 ind.’ respectively). In both cases, USA is required to reduce more
by a factor between 1.4 and 1.5 compared to a flat rate requirement, while EU and the residual
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group (RoA I) have equal requirements and only need to carry 80 percent of the flat rate
burden.
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Figure 10. Differentiated commitments á la Norway with 3 and 2 degrees of freedom for
aggregated groups of countries
4. Summary and conclusions
As a summary we would state that in negotiating a climate treaty there are no way around the
issue of burden sharing. Even within the simplest possible regime, consisting of flat rate
reductions in each Annex 1 country, there is an implicit assumption of how the burden of
commitments should be allocated. The gross unfairness of this ‘grand-fathering’ rule probably
makes it unfeasible as a building block for an international climatic treaty.
In considering other possibilities for burden sharing one comes up against the problem that
many of the countries in the residual group (approximately equal to the OECD countries
outside EU and the USA) wants differentiated commitments, but also want to reduce less than
the average commitment. The logical counter weight to this is, as we have seen, that USA,
with high emission intensities and probably lower abatement costs than most of the other
countries considered here, should reduce more. The question then is what the residual group
can offer USA for such a deal. The EU has found an internal solution (with the help of
sacrifices from Denmark, Germany and Austria) and will probably not want to participate in
this game. It may thus seems that the only way forward is for the residual group to come to
terms with USA in order to tap into this relatively large reservoir of cheap abatement, and
make the payment in term of other concessions to the USA.
However, there is a possible avenue open that has not been explored in this paper, but that
deserves further study. It concerns the position of the economies in transition. Generally, these
countries have marginal reduction costs well below both those of the EU and the USA. A
sensible approach for the residual group is therefore to explore the possibilities for joint
implementation with this group of countries, and Russia in particular. It is still unclear,
however, how stringent the commitments of this group of countries will be under a ‘Kyoto
protocol’. In short, I propose the thesis that differentiated commitments are necessary to
secure both a fair and a feasible outcome of the Kyoto conference, but that the ‘fringe OECD
countries’ outside the EU and the USA will have to be more active vis á vis the economies in
transition (and Russia in particular) in order to secure such a solution.
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6. APPENDIX 1: Annex 1 countries
Annex I Countries Annex I Countries
Australia Japan
Austria Latvia a/
Belarus a/ Lithuania a/
Belgium Luxembourg
Bulgaria a/ Netherlands
Canada New Zealand
Czechoslovakia a/ Norway
Denmark Poland a/
European Economic Community Portugal
Estonia a/ Romania a/
Finland Russian Federation a/
France Spain
Germany Sweden
Greece Switzerland
Hungary a/ Turkey
Iceland Ukraine a/
Ireland United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Italy United States of America
a/ Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
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